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I. INTRODUCTION
HE Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
(DTPA)1 was enacted in 1973 "to protect consumers against false,
misleading, and deceptive business practices, unconscionable ac-
tions, and breaches of warranty and to provide efficient and economical
procedures to secure such protection."'2 In this, the twenty-fifth anniver-
sary of the law's enactment, the DTPA has continued to show the effects
of repeated amendment by the Texas Legislature. Following years of leg-
islative and judicial expansion of consumer remedies, the trend in recent
years has been contraction. The most recent amendments, enacted in
1995 by the 74th Texas Legislature, introduced new restrictions on the
types of commercial conduct that may form the basis of a DTPA claim.
The 1995 amendments, which govern all causes of action accruing on or
after September 1, 1995 and all causes of action, regardless of when they
accrued, filed on or after September 1, 1996, were examined in several
judicial decisions during the Survey period. 3 Most notably, courts have
begun to apply the new restrictions on DTPA claims in cases involving
professional services.4 The provisions of the 1995 amendments excluding
from the statute's coverage nonresidential transactions involving substan-
tial dollar amounts ($100,000 in cases involving a written contract and
$500,000 in all such cases irrespective of the existence of a contract) re-
main to be explored.5
This Survey of significant developments involving the DTPA covers the
time period from October 1, 1997 through September 30, 1998. Notewor-
thy decisions during the Survey period address consumer status, the rela-
1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41 et seq. (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1999).
2. Id. § 17.44(a).
3. See, e.g., infra Parts III A and E.
4. See infra Part Ill A.
5. See § 17.42 historical note (Vernon Supp. 1999) [Act of May 19, 1995, 74th Leg.,
R.S., ch. 414 § 20(b), 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3004].
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tionship of the plaintiff to the defendant, preemption, the proper measure
of damages, and defenses to DTPA claims.
II. CONSUMER STATUS
A. INTRODUCTION
In order to recover under the DTPA, a plaintiff must establish that he
is a "consumer" as that term is defined in the statute. To qualify as a
consumer, the plaintiff must be an individual who seeks or acquires, by
purchase or lease, goods or services, and those goods or services must
form the basis of the complaint.6 Whether a plaintiff is a DTPA con-
sumer is a question of law.7
B. THE CONSUMER'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE DEFENDANT
In Church & Dwight Co. v. Huey,8 the San Antonio Court of Appeals
examined the liability of upstream manufacturers for breach of warranty.
Huey won a bid to repaint the window frames of the historic Travis Build-
ing in San Antonio. To perform the job, Huey purchased a product called
Armex Blast Media manufactured by Church & Dwight, but sold by San
Antonio-based American Graffiti. Although the flyer published by
Church & Dwight represented that the product rinsed away easily, "in
fact it soaked into porous materials, such as brick, and seeped out, leaving
white stains and crystal formations."9 Huey sued Church & Dwight
under the DTPA, claiming misrepresentation and breach of warranty.
Church & Dwight invoked the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Am-
stadt v. United States Brass Corp.,1O which held that upstream suppliers of
component parts cannot be held liable under the DTPA if the claimed
violation did not occur in connection with the consumer transaction giv-
ing rise to the claim." Church & Dwight argued that because it was not
connected to the transaction between Huey and American Graffiti, it
could not be held liable to Huey under the DTPA.12 Rejecting this con-
tention, the San Antonio court noted that Church & Dwight's advertising
reached Huey and induced him to buy Church & Dwight's product. The
court reasoned that:
Church & Dwight's marketing efforts were incorporated into Ameri-
can Graffiti's marketing efforts, and they formed the basis for Huey's
decision to use the product. When American Graffiti gave a demon-
stration of its technique to Huey, it passed along a brochure pub-
lished by Church & Dwight, touting the benefits of its product.1 3
6. See § 17.45(4).
7. Hedley Feedlot, Inc. v. Weatherly Trust, 855 S.W.2d 826, 831 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1993, writ denied).
8. 961 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.).
9. Id. at 563-64.
10. 919 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1996).
11. See id. at 654.
12. See Church & Dwight, 961 S.W.2d at 563.
13. Id. at 565.
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Huey most certainly "sought and acquired" Church & Dwight's prod-
uct based, in part, on the manufacturer's representations. Further, just as
in Arthur Andersen & Co., v. Perry Equipment Corp.,14 Huey relied on
the provider's representations to make a business decision. Church &
Dwight was connected to the transaction, because "Church & Dwight's
medium was the only subject of the transaction."1 5
In another case dealing with the plaintiff's relationship to the purchase
at issue, Chamrad v. Volvo Cars of North America,16 the plaintiff claimed
that he was severely injured when an air bag in a Volvo station wagon
failed to deploy during an accident. Chamrad's DTPA claim against
Volvo alleged breach of express warranties and misrepresentation. 17
However, the owner of the car was not Chamrad but rather his girlfriend,
O'Connor. Chamrad claimed that prior to the purchase of the vehicle, he
accompanied O'Connor to a Volvo dealership in San Francisco where
they were informed of the qualities of Volvo's air bags.18 O'Connor later
purchased the Volvo station wagon in question from a dealership in Vic-
toria, Texas, paid for the car, and placed the title in her name. 19 Af-
firming summary judgment against Chamrad, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that he "was no more than an incidental beneficiary of the purchase. In
order to claim 'consumer' status, the underlying transaction must be con-
summated with an intent to benefit the claimant. '20 Because Chamrad
did not acquire by purchase or lease any goods or services that formed
the basis of his complaint, he did not qualify as a consumer under the
DTPA.21
C. DERIVATIVE LIABILITY
In Coffey v. Fort Wayne Pools, Inc.,22 homeowners contracted with a
distributor selling swimming pool equipment and accessories manufac-
tured by Fort Wayne Pools, Inc. (FWP). The distributor was an in-
dependent contractor who purchased components from FWP and then
packaged those components along with those from other manufacturers
to offer complete pool kits to consumers. 23 The contractor passed out
FWP brochures and showed the consumers models of FWP pools prior to
contracting with them. After entering into a contract to construct pools
for several plaintiffs, the contractor commenced construction and re-
ceived money from each of the plaintiffs. 24 The contractor failed to com-
14. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997).
15. Church & Dwight, 961 S.W.2d at 565-66 (emphasis in original).
16. 145 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 1998).
17. See id. at 671-72.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 672.
20. Id. See also Rodriguez v. Ed Hicks Imports, 767 S.W.2d 187, 191 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
21. See Chamrad, 145 F.3d at 672.
22. 24 F. Supp. 2d 671, 674 (N.D. Tex. 1998).




plete the pool, and the plaintiffs sued, asserting breach of contract and
DTPA causes of action against FWP for the actions of the contractor. 25
Although the plaintiffs admitted that FWP made no direct misrepresenta-
tions to them,26 they claimed that FWP violated the DTPA by breaching
express and implied warranties that their pools would be constructed "in
a workmanlike manner, [by] falsely representing that the pools would be
constructed in accordance with approved standards and by committing an
unconscionable act."'27 Granting FWP's motion for summary judgment,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas con-
cluded that plaintiffs could not "premise FWP's alleged DTPA liability
upon [the contractor's] conduct. '28 The court conducted a thorough re-
view of the relationship between the contractor and FWP and found that
there was no agency relationship under Texas law and that the contractor
at all times acted independently of FWP's direction.2 9 The court empha-
sized that "consumers may not establish DTPA liability based on the
mere existence of a relationship between the parties or the fact that the
parties were 'inextricably intertwined.' ' '30 The court concluded that there
could be no liability premised upon the independent contractor's conduct
absent an actual deceptive act committed by FWP.31
The pivotal question in Universal Surety of America v. Central Electric
Enterprises & Co.,32 was whether a subcontractor could claim DTPA con-
sumer status in an action against a surety of the general contractor. Rec-
ognizing that a surety bond is not in all respects the same as an insurance
policy, the San Antonio Court of Appeals observed that a third party who
seeks insurance proceeds has the same objective as a subcontractor who
seeks proceeds under a payment bond. 33 Accordingly, the court held that
inasmuch as a third party claimant seeking proceeds under an insurance
policy is not a "consumer" under the DTPA, neither is a third party seek-
ing payment of proceeds under a payment bond.34 Because the subcon-
tractor did not seek goods or services from the surety or the general
contractor, the surety bond did not give rise to consumer status under the
DTPA.3 5
D. DOES THE TRANSACTION INVOLVE GOODS OR SERVICES?
An additional issue when determining consumer status under the
DTPA is whether the plaintiff sought or acquired "by purchase or lease,
25. See id. at 675-76.
26. See id. at 684 n.17.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 683.
30. Id. at 684.
31. See id.
32. 956 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. denied).





any goods or services .... ,,36 During the Survey period several cases
turned on this issue.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wilson 37 involved the gratuitous bailment of
an automobile awaiting repairs. The Wilsons approached Sears to per-
form repairs on their automobile. When the Wilsons' Sears credit line
was not sufficient to pay for the repairs, the Sears representative allowed
the Wilsons to leave the car on the Sears lot while they attempted to have
their credit limit raised. The Sears representative promised that the car
would be safely stored at night. The car was stolen, and the Wilsons sued,
claiming that Sears' misrepresentation as to the safekeeping of the auto-
mobile amounted to a violation of the DTPA. 38 The Fort Worth Court of
Appeals agreed. The prospective buyers approached the prospective
seller with the good faith objective of purchasing services, they qualified
as DTPA consumers. 39 In such a circumstance, "no money need change
hands to establish consumer status, '411 and the gratuitous bailment suf-
fices as a service "furnished in connection with the sale or repair of
goods."41
E. LIMITATION ON CONSUMER ASSETS
The DTPA contains an additional limitation on consumer status based
on the assets of the plaintiff. A "business consumer that has assets of $25
million or more, or that is owned or controlled by a corporation or entity
with assets of $25 million or more" cannot claim consumer status under
the DTPA.42
The amount of assets controlled by the plaintiff was a central issue in
NationsBank of Texas v. Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P.,43 a legal
malpractice case arising out of a law firm's representation of the estate of
Texas oilman Noble Ginther. NationsBank addressed the issue of
whether a court applying section 17.45(4) should consider the assets of a
plaintiff acting in a representative capacity, or the assets of the real party
in interest.4 4 The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that in cases
where a corporation acts in a representative capacity, such as a trustee or
an executor, and when any compensation received for damages will not
inure to the benefit of the representative, the trial court should consider
only the assets of the entity being represented: 45
[I]t is undisputed that it was Ginther, not NationsBank, who initially
hired Akin Gump, and it was Ginther, not NationsBank, to whom
36. TEX. Bus & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1999).
37. 963 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
38. See id. at 168.
39. See id. at 170.
40. Id.
41. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(2)
(Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1999)).
42. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1999).
43. 979 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet. h.).
44. See id. at 390.
45. See id. at 391.
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Akin Gump allegedly made misrepresentations and committed
fraud. NationsBank is merely Ginther's successor in interest. We do
not find this shift in interest to be dispositive of consumer status. 46
The court concluded that "the relevant inquiries to be made in deter-
mining consumer status are: (1) to whom the representations were made;
(2) who suffered damages from the representations; and (3) who was af-
fected by the defendants' alleged misconduct. '47
F. INTANGIBLES
Intangibles do not qualify as goods or services under the DTPA. 48 Nor
is recovery under the DTPA allowed for transactions that involve wholly
intangible rights, such as accounts receivable or cash, when the in-
tangibles were not obtained in association with actionable collateral serv-
ices. 49  Frequently, plaintiffs have attempted to make a "service"
associated with the provision of the intangible, the basis of their DTPA
claim.50
A recent example is Hendricks v. Thornton,51 which involved claims by
127 investors against the accounting firm Grant Thornton International.
The investors, many of whom were current or former professional ath-
letes, invested in government securities trading programs offered by Hill-
crest Securities Corporation. In its 1982 marketing brochures, Hillcrest
listed Grant as a reference and invited potential investors to check on the
reliability of Hillcrest and its principals by contacting Alexander Grant &
Co., Grant's predecessor. Hillcrest's 1983 marketing materials also prom-
ised potential investors that Grant would verify the authenticity of the
trades made by Hillcrest.52
Grant argued that the plaintiffs failed to qualify as DTPA consumers
because they had not purchased goods or services from it.53 Agreeing,
the Beaumont Court of Appeals observed that although Grant performed
tax accounting and auditing services similar to those deemed sufficient to
support consumer status in Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment
Corp. 54 there was a critical difference between the two cases:
Unlike the Andersen case, however, there is no evidence of any con-
tract between the investors and Hillcrest which called for an audit to
be performed before any securities would be purchased by the inves-
46. Id.
47. Id. at 392.
48. See, e.g., English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. 1983) (insurance proceeds
not goods or services); Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 174 (Tex. 1980)
(cash not a good or service).
49. See Clary Corp. v. Smith, 949 S.W.2d 452, 464 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, no
writ). See also Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 174-75.
50. See, e.g., Hand v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 483, 500 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (plaintiff attempted to assert DTPA claim based on
defendant's failure to purchase an intangible).
51. 973 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, no pet. h.).
52. See id.
53. See id. at 355.
54. 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1977).
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tors; and there is no evidence that an audit by Grant or verification
of trades by Grant was specifically intended to benefit the investors.
The summary judgment evidence establishes that Grant's services
were incidental to the transaction, and the investors' evidence does
not raise a fact issue indicating that those services were an objective
of the transaction between Hillcrest and appellants. 55
The key factor distinguishing Grant from Arthur Andersen thus ap-
pears to be the fact that the purchasers in Grant had not required any
audit services be performed as a condition to the transaction.56
III. RELATIONSHIP OF THE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT
In addition to establishing consumer status, a DTPA plaintiff also must
show that a "false, misleading or deceptive act" occurred and that such an
act was the producing cause of the plaintiff's damage. 57 Recovery also is
dependent upon a showing that the plaintiff's relationship to the transac-
tion entitles it to relief.58
A. PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
As amended in 1995, DTPA excludes from the statute's coverage
claims "based on the rendering of a professional service, the essence of
which is the providing of advice, judgment, opinion, or similar profes-
sional skill." 59 This "exemption," however, does not protect "advice,
judgment or opinion" that amounts to a material misrepresentation of
fact, a failure to disclose information, unconscionable conduct, or breach
of an express warranty. 60 The first reported judicial decisions applying
this provision appeared during the Survey period.
In Cadle Co. v. Sweet & Brousseau, P.C.,61 a former law firm client
brought legal malpractice and DTPA claims against the firm and its attor-
neys, complaining of the attorneys' failure to respond to written discovery
in prior litigation.62 The law firm filed a motion for partial summary
judgment on the DTPA claims, arguing that DTPA section 17.49(c) ex-
empted them from liability. In one of the first applications of this new
provision, the law firm was granted summary judgment dismissing the
plaintiff's DTPA claims. 63
In Latham v. Castillo,64 the Texas Supreme Court considered whether
an attorney's affirmative misrepresentations to his client can be an uncon-
scionable action under the DTPA. In prior litigation, Latham allegedly
55. Hendricks, 973 S.W.2d at 356-57.
56. See id.
57. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(l)-(3) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1999).
58. See Amstadt v. United States Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 650 (Tex. 1996).
59. See TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.49(c) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1999).
60. Id. §17.49(c)(1)-(4).
61. 1998 WL 101749 (N.D. Tex., Mar. 3, 1998).
62. See id. at *1.
63. The court noted that the plaintiff failed to respond properly to the defendant's
motion. See id.
64. 972 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. 1998).
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told the Castillos that he had filed and was actively prosecuting a medical
malpractice claim on their behalf. In fact, the statute of limitations ran on
the claim without suit being filed. The Castillos filed suit against the at-
torney alleging that he committed malpractice and violated the DTPA by
failing to prosecute the claim as represented. The trial court entered a
directed verdict against the Castillos on all claims because they failed to
present evidence that, but for Latham's negligence, they would have won
the medical malpractice suit.65 Finding that "attorneys can be found to
have engaged in unconscionable conduct by the way they represent their
clients," the Texas Supreme Court reversed the directed verdict. 66 The
court acknowledged that it is not enough for a DTPA plaintiff merely to
prove an unconscionable action or course of action; the defendant's con-
duct also must be the producing cause of the plaintiff's damage.67
Although the plaintiffs failed to present evidence that Latham's actions
caused an economic injury, there was evidence that his actions caused
mental anguish damages, which were recoverable: 68
It is axiomatic that mental anguish damages are actual damages re-
coverable at common law for "some common law torts . . ., and by
analogy for knowing violations of certain statutes such as the Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act." Therefore, the Castillos do not have to
first prove that they have suffered economic damages in order to re-
cover mental anguish damages. 69
Accordingly, though the Castillos' simple negligence claims failed to
show injury proximately related to the alleged unconscionable conduct,
their DTPA claim for mental anguish damages survived.
In City of Garland v. Booth,70 the City of Garland brought an action
against attorneys who had been disqualified from representing the City's
opponents in a prior lawsuit. As part of the settlement in that prior law-
suit, the City's opponents assigned any claims they had against their at-
torneys to the City.71 The attorneys had been disqualified from
representing the City's opponents because a former partner of the law
firm had drafted the agreement at issue in the prior lawsuit for the City. 72
The law firm claimed that the assignment of a legal malpractice cause of
action between the parties in the underlying litigation was in violation of
public policy.73 The Dallas Court of Appeals noted that public policy
concerns against assignment of legal malpractice causes of action between
parties in underlying litigation include the following: (1) the demeaning
65. See id. at 67.
66. Id. at 68.
67. See id. at 69; see also TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon 1987 &
Supp. 1999).
68. See Latham, 972 S.W.2d at 69.
69. See id. (quoting City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 495 (Tex. 1997)).
70. 971 S.W.2d 631, 632 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, no pet. h.).
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 634 (citing Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d 313, 318 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1994, writ ref'd)).
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of the legal profession by a market in malpractice claims; (2) the risk of
collusion between assignor and assignee; (3) the risk that assignment of
legal malpractice claims could deter attorneys from zealous representa-
tion of their clients; (4) the possibility that such assignments could cause
legal services to be less available, especially to clients with inadequate
insurance or assets; and (5) the illogical reversal of roles inherent in al-
lowing a party to sue the adverse party's attorney. 74 Reviewing the facts
in City of Garland, the court found that all of these public policy concerns
were present and upheld the trial court's finding that the assignment was
barred as a matter of law. 75
B. AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS
Typically, a principal may be held liable under the DTPA for the mis-
representations of its employees or agents under general agency princi-
ples. 76 During the survey period, the Texas Supreme Court addressed
agency liability in the context of the sale of limited partnership interests.
In Insurance Company of North America v. Morris,77 the principal is-
sue on appeal was whether an insurance surety was liable to investors
who made loan commitments based on misrepresentations by a broker/
dealer of limited partnership interests in oil and gas partnership pro-
grams. 78 Commonwealth Enterprises, Inc. was engaged in the business of
"structuring and syndicating interests in limited partnerships formed for
the exploration, drilling, development, and production of oil and gas."'79
Commonwealth obtained a commitment from the Insurance Company of
North America (INA) to issue surety bonds guaranteeing the limited
partners' promissory notes issued to fund the purchase of their partner-
ship interests.80 The administrative general partner and managing bro-
ker/dealer of two of the limited partnership units exaggerated the
prospects and potential awards of the programs while, at the same time,
minimizing the risks and misrepresenting the returns on past Common-
wealth programs.8 1 In doing so, they "touted the fact that INA had thor-
oughly reviewed the ... programs, suggesting that INA's approval and
underwriting of the programs meant that they were trustworthy, solid in-
vestments expected to generate two- and three-fold returns with a mini-
mum of risk."'82  However, the private placement memoranda
74. See City of Garland, 971 S.W.2d at 633 (citing Zunga, 878 S.W.2d at 317-18).
75. See id. at 634 (finding, among other reasons, that "[tihe possibility that an attor-
ney's billing practices, correspondence with the client or lack thereof, or strategic deci-
sion ... could be used as a bargaining chip in settlement negotiations could deter attorneys
from zealous advocacy on behalf of their clients" Id.).
76. See, e.g., Henry S. Miller Corp. v. Bynum, 836 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1992); Light v.
Wilson, 663 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1983).
77. 981 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1998).
78. See id. at 669-670.
79. Id. at 670.
80. See id.




accompanying the offerings contained conspicuous notices informing in-
vestors that dealers and salesmen were not authorized to give informa-
tion or make representations on behalf of any entities except for those
specifically set forth in the offering memorandum.8 3 The limited partners
subsequently defaulted on their promissory notes, demand was made
upon INA on its surety bonds, and INA in turn demanded reimbursement
from the investors pursuant to promissory notes and indemnification
agreements that had been assigned to INA. When the investors did not
pay, INA sued.84 The investors counterclaimed, alleging that INA was
jointly responsible for the fraud and misrepresentations made by the in-
vestment advisors who solicited the investors' purchases of the partner-
ship interests.85 At trial, the jury found that INA was liable for
unconscionable acts in violation of DTPA section 17.50(a)(3). 86 The
court of appeals affirmed, finding that the brokers and representatives
who had engaged in the offensive conduct were dual agents of INA and
Commonwealth. The appeals court relied on two theories of agency -
"common law agency and statutory agency under Article 21.02 of the
Texas Insurance Code. ' 87
Reversing the appeals court's agency finding, the Texas Supreme Court
found no evidence that the wrongdoers' authority as soliciting agents ex-
tended to making misrepresentations concerning the quality of the invest-
ments.88 The court drew a distinction between soliciting agents and
agents who would have actual authority to make representations on be-
half of their principal. 89 The court next reviewed Texas law regarding the
status of a plaintiff as a consumer where the consumer's complaints
center around services corollary to an investment. The court concluded
that the investors were consumers of at least some of INA's services, and
that INA therefore was potentially liable for the alleged unconscionable
actions of the sales agents. 90 However, because those actions were not
within the scope of the authority granted the sales agents, INA could not
be held liable under the DTPA for those actions.91
In Tweedell v. Hochheim Prairie Farm Mutual Insurance Ass'n,92 a
group of independent insurance agents brought DTPA claims against an
insurer alleging that the insurance company had made misrepresentations
to them regarding contracts that set forth their status as sales representa-




86. See id. at 671.
87. Insurance Co. of North America v. Morris, 928 S.W.2d 133, 144 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1996), rev'd 981 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1998).
88. See Morris, 981 S.W.2d at 672.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 677.
92. 962 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet. h.).
93. See id. at 686.
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agents' contracts and refused to renew policies issued by the agents be-
cause of high losses under the policies. 94 Hochheim filed a counterclaim
alleging that the agents did not have standing as consumers and had filed
their DTPA claims in bad faith. 95 The agents did not claim that
Hochheim misrepresented the coverage available under the terms of the
policies, but rather that it misrepresented the agents' contractual status
with Hochheim.9 6 The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals found that be-
cause the insurance agents had not "sought or acquired goods or services
by purchase or lease" from Hochheim as required by DTPA section
17.45, the agents did not qualify as consumers. 97
IV. CLAIMS UNDER ENUMERATED DTPA CAUSES
OF ACTION
A. INTRODucrION
The DTPA contains a number of enumerated sections, violation of
which triggers liability under the statute. DTPA claims generally involve
one or more of the following:
(1) "laundry list" claims under section 17.46(b), defining the scope of
"false, misleading or deceptive acts" prohibited by the statute;98
(2) "unconscionable" actions or courses of action;
(3) breach of express or implied warranties;
(4) insurance code violations; and
(5) violations of various statutes incorporating the DTPA.99
B. LAUNDRY LIST CLAIMS
DTPA section 17.46(b) contains twenty-four subparts. Plaintiffs invok-
ing these "laundry list"100 claims are not required to prove or plead the
defendant's state of mind or intent to deceive;10 1 nor have plaintiffs been
required to show that they relied on the alleged deceptions. 02 However,
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 687.
97. Id. Because insurance agents' contractual status with insurance companies is ad-
dressed under Insurance Code § 21.21, the court allowed the agents to maintain their
claims under the Insurance Code. See id.
98. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1999). There are
24 enumerated laundry list items, which generally proscribe particular types of misrepre-
sentations or omissions. See id.
99. Statutes incorporating provisions of the DTPA include: TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§§ 41.005, 41.007, 59.005,221.024; TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 18.11, 35.74(c); TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.0002, 41.002(b)(1), 77.003(b); TEX. GOV'T CODE
ANN. § 2006.012; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 162.012, 164.013; TEX. INS. CODE
ANN. art. 9.48, 21.07-4, 21.21, 21.21-2; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(3-6)(e),
45120), 4552-5.11(0, 4552-5.18(d), 4896-1, 5069-11.11, 5069-13.03, 5069-16.15, 5221f, 5521 L,
5521a-7, 5949, 6573a, 6701(g)-2, 8880, 9020; and TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 684.086.
100. The earliest located reported case reference to the enumerated items listed under
DTPA section 17.46(b) as a "laundry list" occurred in Mobile County Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Jewell, 555 S.W.2d 903, 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1977, writ ref'd).
101. See Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 689 (Tex. 1980).
102. See Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985).
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the issue of whether a consumer should have to show reliance remains
the subject of debate. 10 3 Several significant cases involving "laundry list"
claims were reported during the survey period.
1. Section 17.46(b)(23)-Failure to Disclose
The defendant's failure to disclose information to the consumer prior
to consummation of the transaction is alleged in a great number of laun-
dry list claims. To maintain an action for failure to disclose under DTPA
section 17.46(b)(23), the plaintiff must show that the defendant "fail[ed]
to disclose information concerning ... services which was known at the
time of the transaction. 0 4
The proof required to sustain a claim under section 17.46(b)(23) was
addressed in several cases involving an "as is" clause in a real estate sales
contract. In Pairett v. Gutierrez,10 5 the purchasers of a house brought
DTPA claims against the sellers, complaining of defects discovered in the
foundation of the house after its purchase. The defendants argued that
the sales contract contained an "as is" clause, which precluded any causal
connection between the defendants' actions and the plaintiff's DTPA
claims.10 6 The court recalled the general proposition that "[u]nder the
DTPA, a seller has no duty to disclose to a buyer defects of which a seller
is unaware. '10 7 However, should the seller be aware of material facts
that are undiscoverable by the buyer in the exercise of ordinary care, the
seller does have a duty to disclose such facts.108 Reversing a summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, the court noted that an "as is"
agreement does not bind a buyer if proof of fraudulent misrepresentation
or concealment of information by the seller is shown. 10 9 The court con-
cluded that the "as is" language contained in a standard Texas Real Es-
tate Commission Property Condition Addendum clause was not sufficient
to conclusively preclude the plaintiffs from showing reliance or causation
on the seller's representations. 10 According to the Austin Court of Ap-
peals, in order to successfully invoke an "as is" clause in a sales contract,
the seller must prove that the clause contains language conclusively pre-
cluding the buyer from relying on any representations or knowledge of
the seller and that the buyer is relying solely on his own inspection of the
premises."1
103. See generally Prudential Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Assoc., Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156 (Tex.
1995).
104. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(23) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1999); see
also Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 479 (Tex. 1995).
105. 969 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998 no pet. h.).
106. See id. at 514.
107. Id. at 515 (citing Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 479
(Tex. 1995)).
108. See id.
109. See id. at 516 (citing Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 896 S.W.2d at 161).
110. See id. at 516-17; see also Smith v. Levine, 911 S.W.2d 427,430-33 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1995, writ denied).
111. See Pairett, 969 S.W.2d at 516-17.
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In Erwin v. Smiley,112 the plaintiffs likewise complained about misrep-
resentations and a failure to disclose information regarding a house they
had purchased. Relying on an "as is" clause in the Property Condition
Addendum attached to the sales contract, the defendant claimed that
even if it had made oral misrepresentations or failed to disclose material
facts, such actions or failures could not have been the producing cause of
the plaintiffs' damages.1 13 Applying DTPA section 17.50(a)(1), the East-
land Court of Appeals found that the defendant's actions were not the
producing cause of the plaintiffs' injuries. 114 "To show actual causation in
fact requires proof that an act or omission was a substantial factor in
bringing about the injury which would not have otherwise occurred. ' 115
The court determined that "the validity of the 'as is' agreement is deter-
mined in light of the sophistication of the parties, the terms of the 'as is'
agreement, whether the 'as is' clause was freely negotiated, whether it
was an arm's length transaction, and whether there was a knowing mis-
representation or concealment of a known fact." 116 Because the jury
failed to find that any alleged misleading or deceptive acts or practices
were made knowingly, the defendant's conduct did not fall within DTPA
section 17.50. Additionally, because the evidence showed that both buyer
and seller were similarly situated, that the transaction was arm's-length,
that both parties were represented by counsel, that there was no special
relationship between the parties, and that the "as is" provision was freely
negotiated, rather than mere boilerplate language in a preprinted earnest
money contract form, 117 the court determined that "as is" provision
should be enforced.'1 8 In so holding, the Eastland court focused on the
fact that the seller made the buyer aware that the sale was on an "as is"
basis, as well as the fact that the buyer consulted his attorney before sign-
ing the earnest money contract." 9 In contrasting the Pairett and Erwin
cases, it appears that the extent of actual negotiations between the parties
regarding the "as is" nature of the sale will largely determine whether an
''as is" clause in a Texas Real Estate Commission contract will be upheld
in defense of DTPA claims by a disappointed homeowner.
2. Section 17.50 - Breach of Express or Implied Warranties
Although a DTPA claim may be based upon the breach of an express
112. 975 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1998, no pet. h.).
113. See id. at 338.
114. See id.
115. Id. (citing McClure v. Allied Stores of Texas, Inc., 608 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex.
1980)).
116. Id. (citing Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 896 S.W.2d at 160-62).
117. While the "as is" language excerpted in the opinion was from a pre-printed form,
the court referred to other negotiations regarding the "as is" nature of the sale. Erwin, 975
S.W.2d at 338.




or implied warranty, the DTPA does not itself create any warranties.120
To be actionable under the DTPA, a warranty must be recognized by the
common law or created by statute. 121
In Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Bleeker,122 an insured sued his
liability insurer to recover for the insurer's refusal to accept oral and writ-
ten settlement offers that allegedly were within the policy limits. 123 The
insurance company claimed that its failure to communicate the alleged
offers did not injure the insured because the offers did not include a full
release of all claims against the insured. 124 The Texas Supreme Court
found that the insurance company's failure to inform its insured of al-
leged offers that did not dispose of all claims against the insured could not
be a producing cause of damage to the insured because the insured put
forth no evidence that: (1) he would have accepted the offer if he had
been informed of them; and (2) the offers disposed of all claims against
the insured.1 25 Even though the insurance company erred in not inform-
ing the insured of the offers, there was no causal connection between the
insurance company's failure to inform the insured of the settlement offers
and any damage suffered by the insured.12 6
C. INCORPORATION OF THE DTPA INTO THE TEXAS
INSURANCE CODE
Among the most common of DTPA claims arising from other statutory
duties are those brought under Article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance
Code.127 Section 16(a) of that Article provides:
Any person who has sustained actual damages caused by another's
engaging in an act or practice declared in Section 4 of this Article to
be ... unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of insur-
ance or in any practice specifically enumerated in a subdivision of
Section 17.46(b), Business & Commerce Code, as an unlawful decep-
tive trade practice may maintain an action against the person or per-
sons engaging in such acts or practices. 128
120. See Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex. 1995); see also TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1999).
121. See Parkway Co., 901 S.W.2d at 438 (citing La Sara Grain v. First Nat'l Bank, 673
S.W.2d 558, 565 (Tex. 1984)).
122. 966 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1998).
123. See id. at 491; see also § 17.50(a)(3). Texas courts have recognized that the failure
of an insurance company to notify its insured of a settlement offer may be the basis of a
DTPA claim. See generally American Physicians Ins. Exchange v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842,
847 n.11 (Tex. 1994); Ecotech Int'l, Inc. v. Griggs & Harrison, 928 S.W.2d 644, 649 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
124. See Trinity Universal, 996 S.W.2d at 491.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. TEX. INs. CODE ANN. § 21.21 (Vernon 1998).
128. See id. § 16(a); see Keightley v. Republic Ins. Co., 946 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1997, no writ).
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During the Survey period several DTPA plaintiffs invoked Article
21.21 to complain of alleged unfair or bad faith handling of their insur-
ance claims.
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Vandiver, 29 a home-
owner brought suit against State Farm seeking damages arising from the
destruction of her home by fire for which State Farm denied coverage,
claiming that the plaintiff had committed arson. The trial court entered a
judgment for the plaintiff, and on appeal State Farm argued that no cause
of action existed for the plaintiff's claim of unfair claims practices. Ac-
knowledging that the Texas Supreme Court recognized this theory of re-
covery in Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 131 State Farm
argued that the Texas Supreme Court implicitly overruled this aspect of
Vail in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Watson.13' Although the Watson court
declined to extend Vail to third-party claimants and specifically held that
"Vail remains the law as to claims for alleged unfair claim settlement
practices brought by insured against their insurers,"' 32 State Farm argued
that this latter holding was "mere dicta." 133 The court rejected this argu-
ment, noting that the Watson court expressly limited its holding to third-
party claims, and that the legislature afforded insureds a private cause of
action for unfair claim settlement in 1995 amendments to Article 21.21,
section 4, of the Insurance Code.134 However, the court did agree with
State Farm that Watson specifically modified Vail in one respect. Noting
that Article 21.21, section 16 of the Insurance Code "provides a private
cause of action for any practice defined by section 17.46 of the DTPA as
an unlawful deceptive trade practice,"'135 the court concluded that
"[b]ecause unfair claim settlement practices are not listed in section17.46
as deceptive practices they are not actionable under Article 21.21, Section
16(a)."'1 36 The State Farm court thus recognized that the Texas Supreme
Court's decision in Watson limits its earlier decision in Vail as regards the
application of the DTPA to alleged unfair claims settlement practices.137
In Grunbaum v. American Express Assurance Co.,138 the plaintiff was a
corporate cardholder with American Express Travel Related Services
Company who was covered under a total disability policy offered by
American Express Assurance Company (AEAC). AEAC had given
Grunbaum a summary of policy benefits, which differed from the actual
terms of the full policy in that the full policy contained greater limitations
129. 970 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. App.-Waco 1998, no pet. h.).
130. 754 S.W.2d 129, 132-36 (Tex. 1988).
131. 876 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1994) (on rehearing).
132. Id. at 149.
133. State Farm, 970 S.W.2d at 739.
134. See id. at 739.
135. Id. at 741 (emphasis in original) (citing Watson, 876 S.W.2d at 149 & TEX. INS.
CODE ANN. § 21.21 (Vernon 1998)).
136. Id. (citing Watson, 876 S.W.2d at 149).
137. See id.




Grunbaum lost his right eye in a 1995 accident. Late that same year,
due to an unrelated disease, he lost most of the visual capacity of his left
eye.141° Consequently, Grunbaum was no longer able to work in his cho-
sen profession of photography, 141 and filed claims under the AEAC pol-
icy for disability benefits. 142 AEAC denied his claims based on policy
limitations providing that the total disability must arise within thirty days
after the accident causing the injury. AEAC's defense was that the initial
eye injury in June 1995 did not cause the ultimate total disability, which
had in fact been caused by the disease in Grunbaum's left eye. 143
Grunbaum brought claims for alleged misrepresentations under the In-
surance Codez44 and DTPA. The DTPA claims were based on the dispar-
ity between the summary of benefits provided by AEAC and the actual
terms contained in the policy. 145 The court dismissed Grunbaum's Insur-
ance Code and DTPA claims finding that AEAC had acted in good faith
and within the terms of the policy.1 46 However, the court found that
Grunbaum's claims for misrepresenting the terms of the insurance policy
were not bad faith claims, but rather were based on variations between
the policy and the summary of benefits provided to Grunbaum.147 As a
result, the court allowed Grunbaum to maintain his statutory misrepre-
sentation claims despite the fact that his breach of contract claims failed
as a matter of law. 148 Therefore, Grunbaum's claims under Texas Insur-
ance Code article 21.21 and the DTPA were allowed to survive despite
the fact that AEAC had acted within the terms of the insurance policy in
denying coverage.1 49
Finally, in a case delineating the status of an excess insurer's ability to
bring DTPA claims, National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Insurance Co.
of North America,'50 an excess insurer brought an equitable subrogation
suit against the primary insurance carrier and insurance defense counsel,
seeking to recoup monies it paid on an insured's behalf because the de-
fendants mishandled the insured's defense. Rejecting the excess insurer's
attempt to convert an equitable subrogation claim into something more,
the Houston Court of Appeals held that an excess insurer cannot recover
punitive damages in an equitable subrogation suit, nor can it recover for
gross negligence or violations of the DTPA or the Insurance Code.15'
The court reasoned that:





144. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.55 (Vernon 1998).
145. See Grunbaum, 1998 WL 59491, at *3.
146. See id. at *12.
147. See id.
148. See id. at *11.
149. See id.
150. 955 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied).
151. See id. at 134.
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limiting an excess carrier to a negligence claim is logical because of
the nature of equitable subrogation. . . . [E]quitable subrogation
gives indemnity and no more. Because we have held that an excess
carrier cannot ... recover statutory or punitive damages, allowing it
to bring claims for gross negligence or violations of the DTPA or
Insurance Code would be pointless. 152
V. DETERMINING THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
A. REQUIREMENT OF "KNOWING CONDUCT"
In St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance Co. v. Dal-Worth Tank Co.,153 an
insured complained of its liability insurer's failure to defend and indem-
nify the insured in a prior lawsuit. The claim resulted in the entry of a
default judgment against the insured and an eventual declaration of
bankruptcy. The insured's DTPA theory was that, as a result of the insur-
ance company's actions, it suffered a decline in its "credit reputation.' ' 154
While it was undisputed that the insured had strong credit prior to the
bankruptcy, the insured failed to put forth any evidence that any alleged
decline in reputation injured it in any way. The Texas Supreme Court
found that while there was evidence that the insurance company acted
negligently and in violation of the DTPA, there was no evidence that such
actions were false, deceptive, or unfair.155 Accordingly, there was no evi-
dence that the insurance company acted knowingly in the actions com-
plained of by the insured.1 56 The court thus concluded that although the
insured was entitled to damages under negligence causes of action, mere
negligence did not entitle the insured to statutory treble damages under
the DTPA. 157
B. CALCULATION OF ADDITIONAL DAMAGES
In Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc.,158 a certified class of plaintiffs
brought claims arising out of personal injury and wrongful death injuries
against several manufacturers of asbestos-containing insulating products
and some of their suppliers. After liability and actual damages issues
were decided in the trial court, issues regarding the proper application of
additional damages under DTPA section 17.50(e) arose. The primary is-
sue was whether the DTPA multiplier should be applied not only to ac-
tual damages awarded by the jury but also to prejudgment interest
subsequently awarded by the court.' 59 The Fifth Circuit, in a review of
conflicting opinions by the Texas appellate courts, held the following:
152. Id.
153. 947 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. 1998).
154. Id. at 53.
155. See id. at 54.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998).
159. See id. at 324.
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[tihere are no mandatory punitive damages, and whether to award
them, and how much to award, is a question for the jury (subject to
review for excessiveness). . . the most reasonable view of the ver-
dict.... [is that it] does not reflect [an] intention to have the multipli-
ers . . . apply to anything other than 'actual damages' or
'compensatory damages' as defined in the court's charge. 160
The court concluded that "[t]he most reasonable interpretation of the
verdict [is that] the jury intended the multiplier to apply only to actual or
compensatory damages as found by them, not to something else.' 61
Thus, prejudgment interest would not be applied to the DTPA multiplier
or punitive damages. 162
C. ATrORNEYS' FEES
In Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Stephenson, 63 an insured sought
DTPA damages because of an alleged bad faith denial of a life insurance
claim. The jury found for the plaintiff on both her DTPA and bad faith
claims. 64 The plaintiff elected to recover damages for bad faith practices
prescribed under the Texas Insurance Code in addition to attorneys' fees
under the DTPA.165 The insurance company argued that the plaintiff's
election to accept damages under her bad faith claims precluded her
claim for attorneys' fees under the DTPA.' 66 Rejecting this argument,
the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that "[b]ecause of the remedial pol-
icies underlying the DTPA, a party is entitled to recover attorney's fees
for the successful prosecution of a DTPA claim, even if recovery is on
another theory. ' 167
VI. DEFENSES UNDER THE DTPA
The DTPA has been characterized as a "strict liability" statute, requir-
ing only proof of a misrepresentation, without regard to the offending
party's intent. 168 Some courts have held that certain common law de-
fenses, such as estoppel and ratification, are not available to combat
DTPA claims.169 Other courts have recognized a variety of defenses to
DTPA claims.
160. Id. at 325.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 325.
163. 963 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997, no pet.).
164. See id. at 84.
165. See id. at 92; see also TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.21 (Vernon 1998).
166. Id.
167. Id. (citing Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Williamson, 785 S.W.2d 905, 913 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1990, writ denied)).
168. See, e.g., White Budd Van Ness Partnership v. Major-Gladys Drive Joint Venture,
798 S.W.2d 805, 809 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, writ dism'd).
169. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of North America v. Morris, 928 S.W.2d 133, 154 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ); see also Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616(Tex. 1980) (recognizing that a primary purpose of the DTPA was to relieve consumers of
common law defenses while providing a cause of action for misrepresentation).
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A. A "MERE" BREACH OF CONTRACT IS NOT ACTIONABLE UNDER
THE DTPA
In Coffey v. Fort Wayne Pools, Inc.,170 homeowners who were injured
when an independent pool contractor defaulted on his obligations, as-
serted DTPA claims against Fort Wayne Pools, which supplied compo-
nents for the pools. These claims were based upon statements made by
Fort Wayne's employees after the contractor had failed to finish construc-
tion. 17' The Fort Wayne employees allegedly assured the plaintiffs that
Fort Wayne would do "whatever is necessary to make sure they were sat-
isfied." 172 Rejecting the plaintiffs' attempt to impose DTPA liability, the
court emphasized that "it is well-settled that 'the mere failure to perform
a promise does not constitute a misrepresentation actionable under the
DTPA unless it can be shown that at the time the promise was made, the
party making the promise had no intentions of fulfilling the promise.""'173
Additionally, and in any event, the alleged misrepresentation could not
be a producing cause of the plaintiffs' damages, which were caused by the
original contractor.17 4 Finally, because the plaintiffs' essential complaint
was that their pools were not installed in a timely fashion, they could not
"premise a DTPA claim on the non-performance of a contract. ' 175 This
case is a further illustration of the limitations on upstream liability that
courts have continued to place on DTPA claims following the decision in
Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp.176
In Parks v. DeWitt County Electric Cooperative, Inc.,17 7 a landowner
and his wife brought DTPA claims against an electric cooperative that cut
down trees on an electric utility easement through their property. The
electric cooperative admitted that it had an undisclosed policy of clearing
electric utility easement rights-of-way at its discretion.' 7 8 However, the
plaintiffs alleged that the cooperative had affirmatively represented to
them that it would not cut down any trees on the easement. 179 The coop-
erative argued that the plaintiffs' DTPA misrepresentation claims arose
solely out of the performance of the contract for the easement between
the parties; therefore they were not independently valid DTPA claims.1 80
Reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
cooperative, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals found that because
there was some evidence of misrepresentation by the cooperative regard-
ing plaintiffs' rights under the contract, the DTPA claims should not have
170. 24 F. Supp. 2d 671 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
171. See id. at 685.
172. Id.




176. 919 S.W.2d 644, 649 (Tex. 1995).
177. 962 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. granted).
178. See id. at 712.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 711-12.
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been dismissed.181 Because the misrepresentations were made, in-
dependent of the contract terms, "regarding the Co-op's right under the
contract to 'cut down' trees on appellants' property, the DTPA claim was
independently actionable."' 82
B. PREEMPTION AND EXEMPTION FROM THE DTPA
1. Medical Claims
a. Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act
The Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act (MLIIA) was
enacted in response to "a medical malpractice insurance crisis."' 183 Re-
garding DTPA claims, section 12.01(a) of the MLLIA provides:
Notwithstanding any other law, no provision of Section 17.41-17.63
[of the DTPA] shall apply to physicians or health care providers as
defined in Section 1.03(3) of this Act, with respect to claims for dam-
ages for personal injury or death resulting, or alleged to have re-
sulted, from negligence on the part of any physician or health care
provider.184
In Mulligan v. Beverly Enterprises- Texas, Inc.,185 the representative of a
nursing home patient sued the owner/operator of a nursing home for mal-
practice. The plaintiff's claims included violations of the DTPA based on
the nursing home's alleged knowing misrepresentations about the serv-
ices it would provide and the actual care received at the facility. The
plaintiff claimed that the deficient services and care provided by the nurs-
ing home breached express warranties in violation of the DTPA.
Affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment, the Houston
Court of Appeals held that the Medical Liability and Insurance Improve-
ment Act barred the plaintiff's claims.' 86 The court found that the under-
lying nature of the allegations was that a health care provider was
negligent, and that such claims could not be recast as a DTPA action to
avoid the limitations set forth in the Medical Liability Act: 187
A conclusion that the representations and warranties were breached
requires a determination of whether the nursing home failed to meet
the standard of medical care ... and, therefore, the underlying na-
ture of the claim is one of negligence .... As repeatedly stated by
the Supreme Court ... claims that a health care provider was negli-
gent may not be recast as DTPA actions to avoid the standards set
forth in the Medical Liability Act.' 88
181. See id. at 712.
182. Id.
183. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590 (Vernon Supp. 1997).
184. Id. § 12.01(a).
185. 954 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.).
186. See id. at 884.
187. See id. at 883-84.
188. Id. at 883 (citing Soroklit v. Rhodes, 889 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. 1994); Walden v. Jeffery,
907 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1995) & Gormley v. Stover, 907 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. 1995)).
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In Angeles v. Brownsville Valley Regional Medical Center,189 the par-
ents of a stillborn fetus brought DTPA claims against a hospital for the
failure to dispose of the fetus in a "respectful" manner.1 90 The plaintiffs
also claimed that the hospital's conduct constituted an unconscionable ac-
tion or course of action.' 9' Affirming dismissal of the plaintiffs' DTPA
claims, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals found that because there was
no contract or charge for the handling of the stillborn fetus, the plaintiffs
did not qualify as DTPA consumers. 192 The court recognized that nor-
mally someone in the plaintiffs' position could be considered a consumer
of medical services provided by the hospital and the arrangements for the
fetus could be said to be associated with such services. However, because
in this case there was no "purchase," the supplying of medical services
was expressly exempted from the DTPA under Texas Revised Civil Statu-
tues, article 4590i, section 12.01(a). According to the court, the plaintiffs
could not be considered consumers of medical services, or services inci-
dental to medical services, because there was no purchase or lease of
those medical services about where the complaint was made. 193
b. Application of the "Learned Intermediary Doctrine"
The "learned intermediary doctrine" is one peculiar to cases involving
the duty to warn owed by a medical products manufacturer.' 94 Under
Texas' interpretation of this doctrine, "when a drug manufacturer prop-
erly warns a prescribing physician of the dangerous propensities of its
product, the manufacturer is excused from warning each patient who re-
ceives the drug. The doctor stands as a learned intermediary between the
manufacturer and the ultimate consumer."1 95 The physician's knowledge
of the warnings operates to protect the manufacturer and serves to shift
the duty of explaining risks to the physician unless the warnings provided
to the physician are inadequate or misleading.' 96
In Bean v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,197 the Houston Court of Appeals
applied the learned intermediary doctrine to a case involving breast im-
plant removal surgery. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the learned
intermediary doctrine had been recognized by the Texas intermediate ap-
pellate courts but not by the Texas Supreme Court, and that the interme-
diate courts have not extended it to medical devices.1 98 Rejecting this
argument, the Houston Court of Appeals noted that the Texas Supreme
189. 960 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, pet. denied).
190. Id. at 856.
191. See id. at 857.
192. See id. at 859; see also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987 &
Supp. 1999).
193. See Angeles, 960 S.W.2d at 859.
194. See, e.g. In re Norplant Contraceptive Prod. Liab. Litig., 955 F. Supp. 700, 703
(E.D. Tex. 1997).
195. Id. (citing Aim v. Aluminum Co. of America, 717 S.W.2d 588, 591-92 (Tex. 1986)).
196. See id.
197. 965 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no. pet. h.).
198. See id. at 660.
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Court has cited with approval intermediate court decisions applying the
doctrine in the prescription drug context1 99 and has twice refused writ in
two cases applying the doctrine, finding no reversible error.200 The court
also noted that although no Texas intermediate court had extended the
doctrine to medical devices, no court had refused to do so either, and
other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine to medical devices.20 1 Find-
ing that the prerequisites for application of the doctrine were present, the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.202
c. MDA Claims
Worthy v. Collagen Corp.20 3 involved a DTPA claim against a manufac-
turer of Zyderm, a collagen implant material, alleging that the plaintiff
was injured when she was injected with Zyderm2°4 products to remove
skin defects.205 Zyderm has been classified as a Class III medical device
by the Food and Drug Administration pursuant to the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976 to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (the MDA).20 6
The manufacturer argued that section 360K(a) of the MDA 207 prempted
the plaintiff's DTPA claim. 208 Reviewing the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,20 9 the Texas Supreme Court
agreed.
Recognizing that "Congress did not intend FDA approval of a device
to insulate the manufacturer from all liability for injuries resulting from
its use," the Texas Supreme Court acknowledged that "it seems equally
clear that Congress did not intend FDA approval as merely a precondi-
tion for marketing the device. '210 Surveying decisions from other states
and federal circuits, the court found that following the Medtronic deci-
sion, "most courts have continued to hold that federal requirements on
Zyderm preempt most state claims of personal injuries caused by the
product. '211 The FDA's pre-marketing approval and review of Zyderm
contained conclusions that the product was "safe and effective" and pro-
hibited the manufacture or marketing of the product in a manner incon-
sistent with conditions set by the FDA. Accordingly, the court concluded
199. See id. at 662; see also Aim, 717 S.W.2d at 588.
200. See Bean, 965 S.W.2d at 662-63 (citing Kahn v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 711 S.W.2d
310, 313 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Gravis v. Parke-Davis & Co., 502
S.W.2d 863, 870 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
201. See Bean, 965 S.W.2d at 663.
202. See id.
203. 967 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. 1998).
204. Zyderm is a cosmetic use product made from a purified form of bovine dermal
collagen, a natural protein, that provides structural support for skin, muscles, tendons, and
bones. See id. at 362.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. 21 U.S.C. §360k(a) (West Supp. 1988).
208. See Bean, 965 S.W.2d at 362.
209. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
210. Worthy, 967 S.W.2d at 369.
211. Id. at 376 (citations omitted).
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that "the FDA's requirements concerning Zyderm are entitled to pre-
emptive effect under the MDA .... ,,122 Because the plaintiff's claim, in
sum, was that Zyderm, as approved by the FDA, was unsafe rather than
that it was manufactured, marketed, or used on her in any way other than
as approved by the FDA, her claim contradicted the FDA's specific find-
ings and was thus preempted. The court went on to conclude that "even
if the federal requirements for Zyderm could be viewed as not directly
conflicting with a judgment favorable to Worthy in her action, claims like
hers 'stand[ ] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress,"' and thus, for this additional
reason, were preempted. 213
Less than one month after the Texas Supreme Court delivered its opin-
ion in Worthy, the Beaumont Court of Appeals reached a different result
in Herring v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc.21 4 In that case, the estate
of a pacemaker recipient filed a lawsuit against the manufacturer alleging
that the pacemaker was defective and not of the quality promised.215 Ac-
knowledging that the MDA contains language preempting state law
claims, the court characterized the manufacturer as having taken the "ab-
solutist position" that, as a matter of law, "no person injured by a pace-
maker can ever sue the manufacturer. ' '2 16 Rejecting that position, the
court agreed with the plaintiff's observation that the manufacturer "never
attempted to show how state laws under which [plaintiff's] claims were
brought would impose requirements different from those imposed by the
MDA. '' 217 Finding no conflict between any federal requirement identi-
fied by the manufacturer and any of the plaintiff's claims, the Beaumont
court reversed the trial court's summary judgment for the manufacturer
and remanded the case for further proceedings.2 18
The Beaumont court's decision in Herring is difficult, if not impossible
to reconcile with the Texas Supreme Court's Worthy opinion. In a foot-
note, the Herring court professed "serious concerns with certain factual
representations" contained in the Worthy opinion,219 but avoided any se-
212. Id.
213. Id. at 377 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 507).
214. 964 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, pet. denied).
215. See id. at 754.
216. Id. at 757-58.
217. Id. at 757.
218. See id. at 758.
219. Id. at 755 n.2. Writing for a unanimous court in Worthy, Justice Hecht engaged in
a lengthy analysis of the three separate opinions in Medtronic. As Justice Hecht noted,
Justice Stevens' Medtronic opinion was joined in part by a five-member plurality. Justice
Breyer wrote an opinion concurring in part with Justice Stevens' opinion and Justice
O'Connor wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion joined by three other justices. Addi-
tionally, Justice Breyer noted his agreement with Justice O'Connor's conclusion that a
state common law duty, as well as a state statute, rule, regulation, or other administrative
action, can be preempted by the MDA. See Worthy, 967 S.W.2d at 370. Although the
Beaumont court in Herring quarrels with Justice Hecht's "alignment of Justice Breyer with
Justice O'Connor's lead minority opinion so as to place the [Medtronic's] minority views on
its interpretation of the congressional intent of § 360k(a)," (Herring, 964 S.W.2d at 755 n.2
(emphasis in original)) Justice Breyer's express agreement with Justice O'Connor on this
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rious effort to elaborate. 220 Instead, the Beaumont court offered the as-
sertion that "a careful reading of [Worthy] leads us to conclude that our
subsequent analysis of [Medtronic] is sound, and that [Worthy] is distin-
guishable from the facts and circumstances of [this] case, which is much
closer to the circumstances in [Medtronic]."'221 The Beaumont court
made no effort to support this loosely articulated conclusion. This ap-
pears to be plainly inappropriate given the Worthy court's holding that,
even absent a direct conflict between FDA requirements and a judgment
upon the plaintiff's claims, such claims "stand as an obstacle to the ac-
complishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress," 222 and therefore are preempted for that additional reason. 223
2. Offers of Settlement and Failure to Provide Notice Required by the
D TPA
Generally, a petition "does not need to set forth the formal title of the
DTPA or indicate the specific sections in order to allege a DTPA
claim. '224 Rather, a DTPA pleading is "sufficient if it gives fair and ade-
quate notice of the facts upon which the pleader bases his claim. '2 25 As a
prerequisite to filing suit under the DTPA, a consumer must give at least
sixty days prior written notice to the person to be sued, advising that per-
son of the consumer's complaint and the amount of damages claimed,
including attorneys' fees.2 26 In line with the legislature's intent that no-
tice be given sixty days prior to filing a claim, the DTPA also affords a
defendant the same time period in which to make a reasonable settlement
offer.2 2 7 If the amount tendered in the settlement offer is the same or
substantially the same as the actual damages found at trial, the consumer
may not recover an amount in excess of the amount tendered in the set-
tlement offer or the amount of actual damages found by the trier of fact,
point suggests that Justice Hecht counted the votes correctly. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at
503-05; Worthy, 967 S.W.2d at 370.
220. See Herring, 964 S.W.2d at 755 n.2.
221. Id.
222. Worthy, 967 S.W.2d at 377 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 507).
223. Additionally, the premise underlying the Beaumont court's rationale-that the
facts of Herring are much "closer" to Medtronic than to Worthy (see Herring, 964 S.W.2d at
755 n. 2)-seems particularly questionable. Unlike both Worthy and Herring, the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Medtronic did not involve the FDA's premarket ap-
proval, or "PMA," process, but rather involved a so-called "§ 510(k) notification" process.
See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 470. As Justice Stevens noted in Medtronic, the PMA process is
a "rigorous" one in which manufacturers submit detailed information on their devices,
which the FDA then reviews, spending an average of 1200 hours on each submission. In
contrast, a § 510(k) review is completed in an average of only 20 hours. See id.; see also
Worthy, 967 S.W.2d at 370.
224. Brown v. Henderson, 941 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no
writ); see also Holland Mortgage & Inv. Corp. v. Bone, 751 S.W.2d 515, 519 (Tex. App.-
Houston [lst Dist.] 1987, writ ref d n.r.e.); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fiberglass Specialties, Inc.,
638 S.W.2d 950, 955 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982, no writ); and Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d
598 (Tex. 1985).
225. Brown, 941 S.W.2d at 193.
226. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.505(a) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1999).
227. See id. § 17.5052(a).
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whichever is less. 228
In America On-Line, Inc. v. Williams,229 subscribers to an online com-
puter service brought a class action against the service provider alleging a
violation of the DTPA. On appeal from the trial court's order certifying
the class, American On-Line complained that the trial court abused its
discretion by certifying the class during the mandatory abatement period
afforded by the DTPA when a plaintiff fails to give pre-suit notice to the
defendant. 2311 The Houston Court of Appeals agreed, reversing the certi-
fication decision because of the failure to give proper notice. The court
found that the class notice tendered in the case was not the same as no-
tice on behalf of an individual named consumer and did not afford AOL
the defensive protections contained in the DTPA:231
The DTPA notice in class actions should contain the specific allega-
tions and demand by the named plaintiffs and include a demand that
the defendant settle with others similarly situated. The defendant is
not then entitled to be relieved of liability unless it not only offers to
settle with the named plaintiffs but also with others similarly
situated. 232
Examining a defendant's responsibility to make a "reasonable" settle-
ment offer under the DTPA, the court in Gunn Infiniti, Inc. v.
O'Byrne,233 found that the purchaser of an automobile, which was not in
the condition as represented by the seller at the time of sale, had no duty
to accept a settlement offer that failed to fully compensate him for all
damages incurred. The plaintiff purchased from defendant what he was
told was a new and undamaged car.234 Later he discovered that it was
significantly damaged and repaired prior to the sale.235 The dealer re-
peatedly offered to replace the vehicle but was unable to produce an ex-
act duplicate meeting the plaintiff's specifications at the time of the
original sale.236 When the plaintiff brought suit, the dealership claimed
that the plaintiff had breached his duty to mitigate damages by refusing to
accept the automobile dealership's settlement offers.237 The court found
that, because those offers all failed to fully compensate the buyer for
damages incurred due to the sale of the defective automobile, the plaintiff
had no duty to mitigate his damages. 238
228. See id. § 17.5052(g).
229. 958 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied).
230. See id. at 270.
231. See id. at 276.
232. Id.
233. 963 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. granted).
234. See id. at 790.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See id. at 791-92.
238. See id. at 793; see also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.505(a) & (c) (Vernon
1987 & Supp. 1999).
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C. No PRODUCING CAUSE
When determining whether the actions complained of are the produc-
ing cause of a plaintiff's damages, courts look to whether the alleged
cause is a substantial factor that brings about the plaintiff's injury, with-
out which the injury would not have occurred.239 To sustain a DTPA
claim, the plaintiff's showing of producing cause does not require a find-
ing that the injury was foreseeable. 240 "Producing cause" has been de-
fined as "an efficient, exciting, or contributing cause, which in a natural
sequence, produced injuries or damages complained of, if any."'241
In Brown v. Bank of Galveston,242 a bank foreclosed on a home pur-
chaser's interim financing note. The purchaser sued under the DTPA al-
leging that the bank's foreclosure resulted in the loss of the purchaser's
permanent financing.243 Assuming without deciding that the home pur-
chaser was a consumer, the Texas Supreme Court determined that the
bank's acts either were not the producing cause of the alleged damages or
could not give rise to a violation of the DTPA.244 Because the damages
that were found by the jury, the difference in the completed value of the
house and/or the cost to complete the house, were not damages arising
from the actions of the bank, the court found that there could not have
been a DTPA violation by the bank as a matter of law. 245 Because the
bank's actions were not the producing cause of damages and the plaintiff
asserted no other basis for damages against the bank, the plaintiff did not
qualify as a consumer under the DTPA.246
D. WAIVER
DTPA section 17.42 provides that an attempted waiver of the provi-
sions of the DTPA is void as a matter of law, unless the waiver is in writ-
ing, the parties are in similar bargaining positions, and the consumer is
represented by counsel in the purchase. 247
In Bakhico Co. Ltd. v. Shasta Beverages, Inc.,248 the plaintiff purchased
over 100,000 cans of Shasta soda for sale in Russia.249 The soda was dam-
aged in transport so as to make it undistributable. 250 The plaintiff sued
Shasta, which brought third-party DTPA claims against the manufacturer
239. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Assocs., 896 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex. 1995).
240. See Hycel, Inc. v. Wittstruck, 690 S.W.2d 914, 922 (Tex. App.-Waco 1985, writ
dism'd).
241. Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 801 (Tex. 1975).
242. 963 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. 1988).
243. See id. at 513.
244. See id. at 513-14.
245. See id. at 514.
246. See id. at 514-15.
247. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42 (a) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1999). Addi-
tionally, for a waiver to be enforceable, subsections 17.42(b) and (c), as amended in 1995,
require the selection of the consumer's attorney to be independent of the defendant and
require certain explicit language and conspicuous print size in the waiver.





of the cans, Reynolds Metal Company. 25' Reynolds argued that Shasta's
contract with Reynolds contained a clause waiving any claims against
Reynolds if it failed to give Reynolds notice of the claim within twelve
months following the date of filling the cans. 252 It was undisputed that
the claim was not brought within the agreed time limit. After deciding
that a choice-of-law clause giving preference to Virginia law was invalid,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas con-
sidered whether the waiver clause in the contract precluded Shasta's
DTPA claims.253 Relying upon DTPA section 17.42,254 the court found
that "the contractual limitation of liability agreement did not bar Shasta's
indemnification claims under the DTPA."255
Ostrow v. United Business Machines, Inc.,256 also involved an asserted
waiver of DTPA rights. Ostrow purchased a computer from United Busi-
ness Machines in 1993. Ostrow was unable to use the computer, and after
a consultant was unable to fix it, she returned the computer to UBM for
repair. UBM returned the computer to Ostrow claiming that there was
nothing wrong with it. When Ostrow again unsuccessfully tried to use
the computer, she returned it to UBM and asked for a refund. After
some discussion, Ostrow signed a document titled "Full Payment and Re-
lease," and was refunded the purchase price of the computer less a 15%
restocking fee. UBM gave Ostrow a check for the refund. Written on the
front of the check was "full payment and release" and on the back was
written "[e]ndorsement or deposit of this check represents a release of all
claims by Ostrow & Associates against UBM. ' 257 Ostrow endorsed and
deposited the check and thereafter sued UBM in small claims court seek-
ing damages for violations of the DTPA and for fraud.
Ostrow claimed that the release was a waiver of her DTPA rights and
therefore was unenforceable under section 17.42(a). 258 Rejecting this ar-
gument, the court explained:
We do not believe Ostrow's is the sort of situation from which the
DTPA seeks to protect consumers. To hold otherwise would effec-
tively bar consumers and retailers from settling any disputes without
consulting an attorney and beginning a quasi litigious process. We
hold a DTPA claim arising out of a contract may be barred by accord
and satisfaction.259
251. See id. at *1.
252. See id. at *2. Shasta's third-party claim against Reynolds claimed contribution or,
in the alternative, indemnity, should the plaintiff establish that the cans in fact were defec-
tive. See id.
253. See id. at *4.
254. Reynolds did not present evidence that Shasta failed to qualify as a "consumer"
under the DTPA. See id. at *4, n.6.
255. Id. at *6.
256. 982 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1998, no. pet.).
257. See id. at 103.
258. See id.
259. Id. at 105.
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The distinction between the Ostrow and Shasta decisions may not have
as much to do with the size or bargaining position of the plaintiff as with
the timing of the alleged waiver. In Ostrow, the claimed "waiver" was
entered into after the complained-about transaction while the Shasta
waiver was contained in the parties' contract. These cases suggest that
when the consumer is aware of the facts constituting the claimed DTPA
violation at the time the waiver clause is agreed to, the clause may survive
a section 17.42 challenge.
VII. CONCLUSION
Reported decisions during the Survey period confirm and extend a
trend noted in last year's Survey-namely, the courts' reluctance to em-
brace theories of DTPA liability that extend beyond "traditional" con-
sumer transactions or relationships. Yet the first decisions to interpret
and apply the 1995 amendments do not suggest a lack of nuance in distin-
guishing qualifying transactions from those beyond the statute's reach.
Evidently sympathetic to the Legislature's concern over the potential
mischief inherent in uncritical application of the DTPA's provisions to
professional services, the Texas Supreme Court's Latham decision260
nonetheless recognized-and effectuated-the legislative judgment that
professionals who engage in fraud, unconscionable conduct, or breach of
express warranty should not by virtue of their professional status alone be
exempt from the DTPA's proscriptions.
In the evolving caselaw dealing with privity between the parties, a leit-
motif is likewise beginning to emerge. Although it is settled that the
DTPA's coverage does not depend upon strict contractual privity be-
tween the plaintiff and defendant, it is equally clear that more than proof
of some relation to a common transaction, or "but-for" causality, is re-
quired to invoke the statute's protections. In many cases, the plaintiff
may legitimately claim to have relied on information provided by the de-
fendant, although no direct relationship or communication between the
two can be shown. Comparison of the opinions in Arthur Andersen261
and Hendricks262 suggests that applicability of the DTPA to such cases
may turn upon two factors: (1) whether the plaintiff's contract with the
seller was conditioned upon the defendant's provision of information or
other services; and (2) whether the defendant was aware of such a condi-
tion at the time the services were performed.
In this past year, the courts thus appear to have continued a trend of
limiting DTPA liability to those defendants who have exerted a direct
influence on the plaintiff's decision to enter into a consumer transaction.
260. Latham v. Castillo, No. 96-0986, 972 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. 1998); see also supra Part III
A.
261. See Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Co., 945 S.W.2d at 812; see also supra
Part I1 E.
262. See Hendricks v. Thornton, 973 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, no. pet.
h.); see also supra Part II E.
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Court decisions in the upcoming year bear watching to ascertain what
effect the 1995 amendments' limits on DTPA claims involving substantial
monetary transactions will have on both the number and success of claims
brought by plaintiffs.
